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Abstract 
Tunnels are regarded as one of the most important infrastructures in Europe 
as they may improve the connection of regions and aid economic development 
through facilitating the transportation of people and goods.  
In order to achieve a minimum acceptable level of safety the EC issued the 
Directive 2004/54/EC that describes specific safety measures that have to be 
taken for all road tunnels in the trans-European road network. 
In parallel, there are several qualitative or quantitative methods for measuring 
road tunnels safety, while the method that seems to be the mostly accepted by 
administrative authorities for quantitative risk analysis is the OECD /PIARC 
QRA Model (QRAM) that has been developed by INERIS, WS-Atkins and the 
Institute for Risk Research. QRAM is based on engineering software that aids 
quantitatively assessment of the societal risk because of transporting goods and 
dangerous goods with Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) through road tunnels.  
The aim of the paper is to expose the effectiveness of the measures imposed 
by the EC in Greek road tunnels. A typical road tunnel as designed and 
implemented after the Directive 2004/54/EC is compared to the same tunnel as if 
it was developed before the Directive was put into action. The comparison is 
made on the basis of the societal risk existing in the two cases. 
The conclusion of the paper, based on the outcome of the risk analysis with 
the QRAM method, is that the safety of Greek Tunnels is significantly improved 
due to the implementation of the measures imposed by the EC Directive 
2004/54/EC.  
Keywords:  road tunnel, risk analysis, quantitative analysis, safety, dangerous 
goods, Greece 
1 Introduction 
Road tunnels improve connection between different regions by minimizing the 
time needed for travelling from one region to another. This is quite important for 
both transportation of individuals and goods. Moreover, tunnels may also lead to 
the economic development of those areas that were previously isolated. 
However, the increasing number of these important infrastructures is raising 
upfront an endogenous problem which is the severity of accidents that may 
occur. The most important kind of accident in a road tunnel is fire, as it can lead 
to losses of users and furthermore it may cause significant damage to the 
infrastructure itself along with the environment. The problem is amplified when 
dangerous goods are involved in accidents in road tunnels. 
 
The most important incidents relevant to road tunnels are considered to be the 
Mont Blanc and Tauern disasters (1999), the Kaprun tragedy (2000), the 
Gleinalm tunnel fire (2001) and St Gotthard tunnel fire (2001) which caused 
fatalities and severe traffic restrictions [4]. 
 
One of the most severe road tunnel accident until now is the Mont Blanc Tunnel 
disaster in 1999 which resulted in 39 fatalities and to the closure of the tunnel for 
three years [6]. Conclusions were that fatal consequences could have been 
greatly reduced by a more efficient organization of operational and emergency 
services.  
 
Right after the Mont Blanc Tunnel accident, the Tauern Tunnel disaster came to 
take place and led to a huge fire catastrophe with 12 fatalities [11]. Two other 
fires in road tunnels caused a significant number of casualties. The Gotthard 
Tunnel accident that led to 11 fatalities and the Gleinalm Tunnel accident that 
resulted in five fatalities [1].  
 
The common characteristic of the aforementioned accidents is that all occurred 
in long (> 6km) single bore tunnels. Moreover, apart from the direct impact,  
these accidents led to traffic congestion in alternative routes and in turn, caused a 
further rise in accident risks [6] for many months or even years after the disaster. 
  
Due to these and other high impact accidents in road tunnels, the European 
Commission concluded, after years of consultations, to the Directive 
2004/54/EC. The EU Directive entitled “minimum safety requirements for 
tunnels in the trans-European road network” is today one legislative text of 
major importance for EU countries, setting basic requirements for tunnels in the 
Trans-European Road Network. The EU Directive lays down a set of harmonised 
minimum safety standards dealing with the various organizational, structural, 
technical and operational aspects. The aim of the EU Directive is to ensure that 
all tunnels longer than 500 meters, whether in operation, under construction or at 
the design stage, comply with the new safety requirements. 
 
In order to achieve a minimum acceptable level of safety, the EU Directive 
suggests, apart from the measures imposed based on tunnel characteristics, the 
implementation of a risk analysis in cases such as the opening of a road tunnel to 
dangerous goods. However, the EU Directive does not indicate either the method 
for performing the risk analysis or the criteria for risk acceptance. Thus, each 
country / administrative authority or even each tunnel manager may select the 
appropriate method of analysis as well as the criteria for risk acceptance. The 
method that seems to be the most widely accepted by administrative authorities 
for quantitative risk analysis is the OECD /PIARC QRA Model (QRAM). The 
QRAM not only assesses the risks from the transportation of dangerous goods in 
a quantitative way but it also evaluates the effect of the mitigation measures 
carried out in a specific road tunnel [17]. 
 
The research problem that this paper addresses is the improvement of safety in 
Greek road tunnels due to the adoption of the EU Directive. The research is 
based on the comparison of the societal risk existing in a typical road tunnel 
designed and implemented after the EU Directive to the societal risk existing in 
the same tunnel as if it was developed before the Directive was put into action. 
The method used in this work regarding the quantitative risk analysis and the 
societal risk assessment is the aforementioned QRAM.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the 
literature review for risk analysis in road tunnels and the use of QRAM. The 
third section provides information about the evolutions in the operational safety 
of Greek road tunnels whereas the fourth section is divided in two subsections 
dealing with the pilot case description and the QRAM results. The paper 
concludes with a discussion section which summarises the findings and makes 
some suggestions for further research.  
 
2 Literature Review  
Risk management entails the processes of risk identification, analysis, mitigation 
and follow up and for each process a set of potential tools exist to aid risk 
managers in their work [12]. Specifically for risk analysis simulation is one of 
the mostly used tools [16], [18]. Risk analysis methods were initially developed 
quantitatively in the nuclear industry in the early 1970’s [15]. After two severe 
accidents with hazardous materials in chemical plants (Bhopal, Seveso) the risk 
analysis methods were adjusted to chemical plants in the late 1970’s [2].  
 
In the context of transport, quantitative risk analysis was initially applied to 
transportation of hazardous materials and later to all transport. The fundamental 
steps in the risk analysis methods for these different applications are the same 
and involve the description of the system, the identification of hazards and the 
assessment of the frequency as well as the consequences of each hazard. 
 
Risk analysis for road tunnels produces a quantified risk expressed as an 
individual risk and a societal risk arising from the public’s aversion to high 
numbers of fatalities in a single accident [8]. A broad range of quantitative 
methods are available, thus the choice of the methods should be done by 
considering the respective advantages/disadvantages in the context of a specific 
situation [14]. 
 
However, one of the most widely accepted quantitative methods for measuring 
road tunnel safety is the QRAM that has been developed by INERIS, WS-Atkins 
and the Institute for Risk Research. The aim of the QRAM is to quantify the 
risks due to transport of dangerous goods on given routes of the road system. A 
complete assessment of the risks involved in transporting dangerous goods 
would require consideration of all kinds of dangerous materials and other general 
variables such as meteorological conditions. As the coverage of all 
circumstances is very difficult in practice, simplifications are made. Thus, the 
QRAM considers 13 accident scenarios. These accident scenarios (namely HGV 
fire 20 MW, HGV fire 100 MW, BLEEVE of LPG in cylinder, motor spirit pool 
fire, VCE of motor spirit, chlorine release, BLEEVE of LPG in bulk, VCE of 
LPG in bulk, torch fire of LPG in bulk, ammonia release, acrolein in bulk 
release, acrolein in cylinders release, BLEEVE of carbon dioxide in bulk) are 
representative of the groupings of dangerous goods as described in the proposed 
regulations of PIARC [13] and have been chosen to examine different severe 
effects such as overpressure, thermal effect and toxity [9]. The QRAM 
methodology is based on the following steps [17]. 
 
1. Choice of a restricted number of dangerous goods 
2. Choice of representative accidental scenarios implying those dangerous 
goods 
3. Identification of physical effects of those scenarios for a tunnel section  
4. Evaluation of their physiological effects on road users and on the local 
population taking into account the possibilities of escape/sheltering 
5. Determination of yearly frequency of occurrence and relevant number 
of fatalities (+injuries) for each scenario   
       
 The most important inputs of the model include:  
 a) The infrastructure of the tunnel  
 b) The mechanical and electrical installations of the tunnel 
 c) Traffic data   
 
 
The outcome of the Model is the Individual Risk as well as the relevant F/N 
curves for fatalities and injuries [7]. F/N curves present graphically the frequency 
(F) of accidents with N or more victims, where N ranges upward from 1 to the 
maximum possible number of victims in the system [5]. The evaluation of the 
tunnel based on the F/N curves provided by the Model is usually made either on 
a comparative basis (comparison to alternative routes) or according to the 
positioning of the F/N curves compared to a threshold of non tolerable risk. In 
this work, the safety of the examined tunnels is evaluated with respect to one 
another option.  
 
The version of the Model used in this work is the currently latest QRAM-DG 
3.61 version. The model consists of spreadsheet-based tools and a Fortran 
program for some finer results. It is aimed at being simple to use, but experts 
may make changes to take account of specific situations or data [10]. The Model 
is already used in several European Countries [14] whereas in Greece, the use of 
the QRAM has been proposed by the Greek tunnel administrative authority as 
the most suitable method for risk analysis when transportation of dangerous 
goods is allowed through a tunnel. However, the proposal is still under approval 
process by the State. 
 
It must be mentioned that the literature concerning the use of the QRAM is not 
as extensive as one would expect, compared to the extent of its use. Most 
publications relevant to the QRAM refer to case studies. Thus, the research gap 
identified here is that the evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures imposed 
by the EU Directive in the trans-European road network for the transportation of 
dangerous goods has not been studied as a standalone issue. It should be noted 
here that HGVs that do not carry dangerous goods but may lead to significant 
fires (greater than 20MW) when involved in an accident are taken into 
consideration by the QRAM.  In this study only these types of HGV will be 
taken into account, thus the typical dangerous goods are excluded. This option 
has been followed so that this research could investigate the improvement in 
Greek road tunnels by the enforcement of the EU Directive even for cases where 
dangerous goods vehicles (DGVs) are not allowed in a tunnel. The improvement 
when DGVs are allowed in a tunnel is expected to be even broader. 
 
3 Evolutions in operational safety of Greek road tunnels 
The last decade many new roads and highways have been constructed, with 
many long tunnels due to the mountainous Greek terrain. In fact, Greece will be 
ranked fourth among EU-15 members in number of tunnels with length greater 
than 500m after the year 2010, therefore it is only natural that the safety of road 
tunnels is an issue of crucial importance.  
The EU Directive of 2004 changed deeply the way road tunnels are constructed 
in Greece. The mitigation measures of a new tunnel as required by the EU 
Directive are described in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 1: Minimum safety measures enforced by the EU Directive 
 
Classes  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 
 
Corresponding 
2004/54/EC 
category 
Tr <2000 Tr <2000 Tr >2000 Tr >2000 Tr 
>2000 
500<L<1000 L>1000 500<L<1000 1000<L<3000 L>3000 
Structural 
measures 
Emergency exits N N Every 500m Every 500m Every 
500m 
Cross-connections 
for emergency 
services 
N Every 
1500m 
N Every 1500m Every 
1500m 
 Control center N N N N Y 
Monitoring 
systems 
Video N N N N Y 
Automatic 
Incident 
detection/ fire 
detection            
Y Y Y Y Y 
Ventilation Mechanical 
Ventilation 
N N N Y Y 
Equipment 
to close the 
tunnel 
Traffic signals 
before entrance 
N Y N Y Y 
Traffic signals 
inside tunnel 
N N N N Y 
  Radio re-
broadcasting for 
emergency 
services 
N N N Y Y 
 
 
However, it has been noticed that all the new tunnels built in Greece after the 
enforcement of the EU Directive are designed and equipped with much more 
safety features than required. It is indicative that a typical design consists of twin 
bore (uni-directional) tunnels with two lanes per tube and the typical 
characteristics showed in Table 2. On the contrary, the majority of Greek road 
tunnels in the past were bi-directional single bore tunnels with two lanes in total 
for both directions, equipped with neither mechanical ventilation, nor monitoring 
systems. Typical paradigms are the Vrachassi road tunnel in Crete, the Aetos 
tunnel in Arta and many others. Even in long tunnels with length more than 
1000m and dense traffic volume the design and construction characteristics were 
similar to the aforementioned. Typical example of such a case was the tunnel of 
Artemissio in Peloponnesus. 
 
4 Case study 
4.1 Pilot case description 
The aim of the research is to expose the effectiveness of the measures imposed 
by the EU Directive of 2004 in Greek road tunnels. A typical road tunnel as 
designed and constructed after the EU Directive is compared to the same tunnel 
as if it was developed before the EU Directive was put into action. In Table 2 the 
main characteristics of both typical tunnels examined is presented. 
  
Table 2: Main characteristics of the tunnels examined 
 
Cases   Case 1  Case 2  
(old specifications) (new specifications) 
 Length (m) 1500 1500 
Construction 
data 
Type Single-bore Twin-bore 
 Lanes (per direction) 1 2 
 Gradient 0% 0% 
 Camber 2,50% 2,50% 
 
 Width (m) 9,5 9,5 
 Open cross-sectional area 
(m2) 
66 66 
Structural 
measures 
Emergency exits 2 (every 500m) 3 (every 375m) 
Cross-connections for 
emergency services 
N N 
 Drainage open area (m2) 0,08 0,08 
  Drainage interval (m) 75 25 
Monitoring 
systems 
Control center N Y 
Video N Y 
 Automatic Incident 
detection and/or fire 
detection 
Υ Y 
  Emergency 
communications 
Υ Y 
Ventilation Mechanical Ventilation N Y 
Normal Operation (m3/s) 0 160 
Emergency operation (m3/s) 0 220 
Equipment to 
close the 
tunnel 
Traffic signals before 
entrance 
N Y 
Traffic signals inside tunnel N Υ 
 Radio re-broadcasting for 
emergency services 
N Υ 
  Time to stop traffic (min) 180 5 
 The comparison of the safety of the two typical tunnels is made regarding their 
societal risk for three different traffic volumes. The first is 5000 vehicles/day, the 
second is 9000 vehicles/day and the last is 15000 vehicles/day. Table 3 shows 
detailed traffic-related data that are common for the three traffic volume 
scenarios. 
 
Table 3: Detailed traffic-related data 
 
Traffic-related data 
HGV traffic (% of total traffic) 9 
Bus traffic (% of total traffic) 1,5 
Average number of persons in a car 1,85 
Average number of persons in a HGV 1.17 
Average number of persons in a bus/coach 40 
 
This paper explores the safety of typical tunnels and not specific existing ones. 
Since the transportation of dangerous goods is forbidden in the majority of Greek 
road tunnels up to now, consideration is taken only for HGVs that do not carry 
dangerous goods but may lead to large fires, and therefore calculations are 
performed only for scenario 1 and scenario 2 of the QRAM.    
 
4.2 QRA model results 
The following charts show the results of the QRAM for the three cases 
examined. In each chart the F/N curve of the “old” type of tunnel is compared to 
the F/N curve of the “new” type of tunnel, according to the assumed traffic 
volume. 
 
For traffic volume 5000 vehicle/day (case 1) for the typical tunnel with the old 
specifications, the expected value (fatalities+injuries per year) is 1,285E
-2
 whilst 
for the tunnel with the new specifications it is 1,344E
-3
. By this yardstick the 
level of safety of the “new” tunnel is almost 10 times (one grade of magnitude) 
higher than that of the “old” tunnel. As shown in Figure 1, the F/N curve of the 
new type tunnel lays well below the F/N curve of the old type for any given 
number of victims. Additionally, the maximum number of victims for the new 
type of tunnels is less than 7 whereas for the old type may lead to more than 15 
victims. 
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Figure 1: Safety level comparison for traffic 5000 vehicles/day  
 
 
In case 2, traffic volume is assumed to be 9000 vehicles/day. For the typical 
tunnel with the old specifications the expected value (fatalities+injuries per year) 
is 2,646E
-2
 while for the tunnel with the new specifications is 4,08E
-3.
 By this 
yardstick the level of safety of the “new” tunnel is almost 6,5 times higher than 
that of the “old” tunnel. As shown in Figure 2, the F/N curve of the new type 
tunnel lays well below the F/N curve of the old type for any given number of 
victims. Additionally, the maximum number of victims for the new type of 
tunnels is almost 12 whereas for the old type may lead to more than 25 victims. 
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Figure 2: Safety level comparison for traffic 9000 vehicles/day  
                                                             
 
Lastly, for traffic volume 15000 vehicles/day (case 3), for the typical tunnel with 
the old specifications the expected value (fatalities+injuries per year) is 
calculated as 5,325E
-2
, while for the tunnel with the new specifications it is 
1,074E
-2. By this yardstick the level of safety of the “new” tunnel is about 5 
times higher than the “old” tunnel. As shown in Figure 3, the F/N curve of the 
new type tunnel lays well below the F/N curve of the old type up to 14 victims. 
For a number of victims ranging between 15 and 19 there is the same probability 
for both the “new” and the “old” tunnel. However, the maximum number of 
victims for the new type of tunnels is 19 whereas for the old type may lead to 
more than 40 victims. 
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Figure 3: Safety level comparison for traffic 15000 vehicles/day 
  
5 Conclusions and Further research 
For all the examined cases the typical Greek tunnel designed or/and constructed 
after the adoption of the EU Directive has a higher level of safety than the same 
tunnel as if it was constructed before the implementation of the Directive. It is 
therefore deduced that the safety measures imposed by the EU significantly 
improved the safety of Greek road tunnels. 
 
Although the implementation of the EU Directive seems to improve the safety 
level of road tunnels in the trans-European road network, an interesting further 
investigation would be to explore the sufficiency of the minimum tunnel safety 
measures imposed by the EU Directive. Another controversial area for further 
investigation is whether the traditional way of risk assessment is sufficient for 
human-technical systems such as road tunnels. Traditional risk assessment 
techniques are neither dynamic nor systemic enough to cope with the danger 
arising from humans’ actions in such systems. The investigation of new risk 
assessment techniques in human technical systems would therefore have great 
scientific interest.   
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